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ABSTRACT
Using the methods of philosophical analysis and concepts from 
moral and political philosophy Indigenous Peoples’ human right 
to control access to their cultural information is defended. The 
concept of a “right” is delineated and different types of rights 
are differentiated. The method of an “overlapping consensus” is 
used.  In  attempting  to  articulate  the  moral  foundation  for 
Indigenous  Peoples’  rights  to  culture,  we  can  start  with 
justifications for limiting access that are already widely accepted 
within  our  society.   These  widely  accepted  justifications  for 
controlling or limiting access to information include the claim 
that said information is (a) under copyright, (b) a trade or state 
secret, (c) harmful to some segment of society, or is (d) private 
or confidential.  The moral grounds for each of these limitations 
on free access is explored.  (a)-(c) are found to not provide an 
adequate ground for Indigenous People’s rights to control access 
to their culture.  The cultural rights of Indigenous Peoples are 
defended  as  a  form  of  group  privacy.  Two  possible  moral 
dangers of this defense of indigenous peoples rights to culture 
are  considered.   It  is  shown  that  on  a  properly  nuanced 
understanding of the contours of the Indigenous Peoples’ rights 
to group privacy, they do not give rise to either of these dangers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Non-Indigenous Americans belong to a national culture that has 
benefited  from  their  past  and  ongoing  oppression  and 
destruction of Native American peoples and cultures. As such, 
we share, along with other colonial and majority populations, a 
collective  responsibility  to  these  peoples.  Thus,  non-native 
persons, organizations, and governments have good reasons to 
support any efforts on the part of native peoples to assert their 
rights.  One of the persisting harms done to indigenous peoples 
is  the  attempted  destruction  of  their  cultures.  This  attempted 
destruction  has  been  two-fold.   First  is  the  attempted forced 
assimilation  of  indigenous  peoples  into  the  culture  of  the 
colonizers.  The  second  is  the  appropriation  of  that  culture 
through  unethical  anthropological  practices,  as  well  as  the 
collection and fetishization of native cultures as representations 
of the exotic, authentic, spiritual, or savage.
In this context, the movements of Indigenous peoples around the 
world to reassert their connection to their cultural heritage are a 
positive sign.  This assertion has already affected the practice of 
archaeology, anthropology, and other disciplines that focus on 
researching  indigenous  peoples  and  cultures.  Indigenous 
peoples’ continued efforts to get back control of their cultural 
heritage has and will continue to have important implications for 
those  concerned  with  collecting,  storing,  organizing,  and 
providing access to cultural information, e.g., libraries, archives, 
and museums. 
On September 13, 2007 the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted  the  Declaration  on  Rights  of  Indigenous  Peoples 
(UNDRI)  [1].   The  UNDRI  asserts  group  rights  of  cultural 
possession and control,  which should be of central interest to 
those in the field of information.  According to Article 31 of the 
UNDRI,  for  example,  Indigenous  Peoples  have  rights  to 
“maintain,  control,  protect  and  develop  their  intellectual 
property  over…cultural  heritage,  traditional  knowledge,  and 
traditional cultural expressions.”   And, according to Article 15, 
Indigenous Peoples have the right to redress for or restitution of 
“cultural,  intellectual,  religious  and  spiritual  property  taken 
without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of 
their laws, traditions and customs.”  These provisions express 
the  ideals  behind  a  world-wide  movement  by  Indigenous 
Peoples to reclaim their cultural heritage [2], [3].
The question for those interested in the preservation and free 
flow of information is how to balance the rights of indigenous 
peoples  to  culture  with  the  rights  of  individuals  to  access 
information.  In order to determine where this balance might be 
we need a deeper understanding of the grounds of the rights of 
indigenous peoples over their cultural information.  Only if we 
understand the justification for and the function of these rights 
can we understand fully what they may reasonably demand of 
us.  Providing such a justification is the goal of this paper. 
2.  THE  PROTOCOLS  FOR  NATIVE 
AMERICAN ARCHIVAL MATERIAL AND 
RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS
Recently,  a  number  of  Native  and  Non-Native  American 
Librarians and Archivists collaboratively drafted the “Protocols 
for  Native  American  Archival  Material”  (PNAAM)[4]. 
PNAAM  describes  in  detail  what  these  professionals  and 
community members consider the best practices in the handling 
of  Native  American  archival  materials  housed  in  archives, 
libraries, museums, etc.  Materials covered by PNAAM include 
recordings  and  transcripts  of  such  works  as  songs,  chants, 
personal  or  family  information,  oral  histories,  community 
histories, "myths,” and folklore; Cartographic Materials of such 
things as sacred sites or areas, village sites, territories, use areas; 
and  archaeological  data,  ethno-botanical  materials,  or 
genealogical data.  
2.1 NAGPRA and Information Objects
Discussions  of  indigenous  cultural  rights,  particularly  in  the 
United States,  cannot  be understood without some familiarity 
with the  Native  American  Grave  Protection  and  Repatriation 
Act  (NAGPRA).   NAGPRA,  which  was  passed  in  1990, 
requires  the  cataloguing  and repatriation of  Native American 
human  remains,  funerary  objects,  and  objects  of  “cultural 
patrimony.”  According to the National NAGPRA Report so far, 
“there have been 360 Notices of Intent to Repatriate published…
which  account  for  118,442  funerary  objects,  3,585  sacred 
objects,  296  objects  of  cultural  patrimony,  and  768  sacred 
objects that are also cultural patrimony”[5]. 
For  the  purposes  of  thinking  about  the  status  of  cultural 
information the most important component of NAGPRA is 
the  definition  of  "cultural  patrimony"  which  the  statute 
defines as “an object having ongoing historical, traditional, 
or cultural importance central to the Native American group 
or culture itself, rather than property owned by anindividual 
Native American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, 
appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of 
whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian tribe 
or Native Hawaiian organization and such object shall have 
been considered inalienable by such Native American group 
at the time the object wasseparated from such group” [6].
Some have argued that the cultural patrimony section of the 
law covers information objects, such as songs, descriptions 
or pictures of rituals, etc.  However, the language of it being 
“an object” implies that it does not cover information, which 
is not typically described as an “object.”  We can make a 
distinction  between  an  object—such  as  a  manuscript 
describing a ritual, recording of a song, picture of a basket, 
and the information contained in that object.  Thus, even if 
NAGRPA covers the returning of the object, our question is 
whether  it  includes  the  “return”  of  control  over  the 
information contained in the object.  Compare the rights I 
may  have  in  a  painting  and  the  rights  I  have  in  any 
reproductions  of  that  painting.  If  someone  steals  the 
painting  from  me,  I  have  rights  to  have  the  painting 
returned,  but  I  do  not  necessarily  have  any  rights  in 
reproductions.  The  right  in  reproductions  may  be  with 
someone  else,  e.g.,  the artist,  or  it  may be in  the  public 
domain.  While NAGPRA provides us with a model of how 
cataloguing  and  repatriation  works,  and  thus,  provides  a 
guide for how such cataloging and repatriation might go for 
cultural  information,  NAGPRA  itself  does  not  presently 
provide  a  legal  requirement  for  the  cataloguing  or 
repatriation of cultural information.   
2.2 The Provisions of PNAAM 
PNAAM is particularly laudable insofar as it tries to balance the 
rights  and  responsibilities  of  both  tribes  and  non-tribal 
information stewards, by providing a list  of best practices for 
both  communities.  It  calls  for  the  creation  of  relationships 
between  the  tribes  and  archives.  Thus,  anyone  dealing  with 
Native  American  archival  materials  must  read  and  seriously 
consider PNAAM.  
To  give  a  sense  of  the  suggestions  in  PNAAM it  is  worth 
quoting some of the recommendations at length.  With regard to 
removal or intentional non-preservation of information objects, 
PNAAM states that,  “Some items,  such as a photograph of a 
sacred  ceremony,  or  object,  or  culturally  sensitive 
documentation of a burial,  should not be preserved forever or 
may  need  to  be  restricted  or  repatriated  to  the  culturally 
affiliated group” [4]. With regard to restricted access, PNAAM 
states  that  archivists  and  others  ought  to,  “Respect  a 
community’s request to restrict access to and use of materials 
that  describe  and  represent  esoteric,  ceremonial,  or  religious 
knowledge that is significant to the community” [4].  Clearly, 
although  such  material  may  be  in  the  form  of  original 
documents in an archive, it may also be included in published 
works held by academic and public libraries.  Thus, the same 
reasoning  that  would  lead  to  restricting  access  to  archival 
materials  which  represents  such  knowledge  would  lead  to 
restricting  access  to  published  works  that  represent  such 
knowledge. 
3. INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM AND THE 
INFORMATION PROFESSIONS
A number of authors in both philosophy and LIS have argued 
that access to information is key to our capacity to enjoy our 
democratic  and  personal  freedoms.  Alfino  and  Pierce,  for 
example,  argue that,  “information… in  the context  of  guided 
inquiry…supports the development  of  personal  autonomy and 
personal agency” [7]. Information Professionals, particularly in 
the U.S. context, see their profession as devoted to intellectual 
freedom  and  the  public  domain.   The  American  Library 
Association, for instance, proclaims that, "Intellectual Freedom 
is  the  right  of  every  individual  to  both  seek  and  receive 
information from  all  points  of  view  without  restriction.  It 
provides  for  free  access  to  all  expressions  of  ideas through 
which any and all sides of a question, cause or movement may 
be explored. Intellectual freedom encompasses the  freedom to 
hold,  receive  and  disseminate  ideas”  [emphasis  added]  [9]. 
These  values  are  also  embedded  in  the  United  States 
Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that access to 
information is a constitutional right.  “The right of freedom of 
speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, 
but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read 
(Martin  v.  Struthers,  319  U.S.  141,  143  )  and  freedom  of 
inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wieman 
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 )” [8]. 
This commitment makes any content-based restriction on access 
to  information  is  suspect.   A possible  case  might  make  the 
possible concerns clearer.  Suppose, for example, that a student 
researching folklore wishes to access a recording of a traditional 
song held by a library or archive.  Perhaps he or she wishes to 
determine whether or how this story might be related to stories 
in  other  cultures.   Suppose  that,  after  the  library  or  archive 
consults with the tribe from which the story originated, the tribe 
wishes to deny access to anyone engaged in this sort of research. 
Ought the library to restrict access? What would the Library Bill 
of  Rights  (LBR),  for  example,  advise  a  librarian  or  other 
information professional to do? 
According  to  Article  three  of  the  LBR,  “Libraries  should 
challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their responsibility to 
provide information and enlightenment” [9] It may appear that 
restricting access to information because a particular group does 
not  want  outsiders  to  know  the  information  amounts  to 
censorship. Even if such limitations are not “censorship” per se, 
they  may  still  illegitimately  infringe  our  rights  to  access 
information. Indeed, the LBR recognizes that there are a wide 
range of ways in which our rights of expression and access may 
be abridged and calls for resisting them.  According to Article 
four of the LBR, “Libraries should cooperate with all persons 
and  groups  concerned  with  resisting  abridgment  of  free 
expression and free access to ideas.”  [9]. And Article five of 
LBR seems to pose some serious problems for some of the best 
practices  listed  in  PNAAM.  Furthermore,  if  groups wish  to 
limit access to works based on the ethnic origin  (e.g., whether 
or not one is a tribal member), age, or gender of the patron, this 
may conflict with the requirement of the LBR that, “A person’s 
right to use a library should not be denied or abridged because 
of origin, age, background, or views” [9].                           .        
In order to answer our question of how to balance the rights of 
indigenous peoples to their culture with the rights of individuals 
to access information we need to have a deeper understanding of 
the  grounds  for  these  rights.  Only  if  we  understand  the 
justification for and function of these rights can we understand 
fully what they demand of us and what they require.  Since the 
focus  here  is  on  the  rights  of  indigenous  peoples  to  control 
access  to  information  and  the rights  of  individuals  to  access 
information, it will be worthwhile to familiarize ourselves a bit 
with the literature on “rights.” 
4. RIGHTS
Both those who champion individual rights to access and use 
information  and  those  who  assert  the  rights  of  indigenous 
peoples over this information use the language of “rights.”  This 
is most clear in the the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, and the Library Bill of Rights.  However, 
it  is  also  a  powerful  theme  in  PNAAM,  which  states,  for 
example,  that,  “Libraries  and  archives  must  recognize  that 
Native  American  communities  have  primary rights for  all 
culturally sensitive materials  that  are culturally  affiliated with 
them.  These  rights apply to issues of collection, preservation, 
access,  and  use  of  or  restrictions  to  these  materials”  [4] 
[emphasis  added].   It  will  be useful,  then, to briefly discuss 
what rights are, and more specifically how we should understand 
the  rights  claimed  by  those  advocating  access  and  those 
advocating the rights to control access and use of information.
Typically when someone says that they have a right to x, they 
are referring to what the rights theorist  W.H.  Hohfeld called 
“claim rights” [12].  If I have a claim right to read, for example, 
that means that others would have correlative duties that they 
ought to fulfill. If I have a claim right to read a book, then you 
may  have  some  sort  of  duty  to  make  the  world  such  that  I 
actually can effectively read. If you fail to do your duty, then 
you  are  “violating”  my  right.  Your  duty  might  be  to  not 
interfere. So, for example, in asserting my right to read, I may 
be saying that you have a duty to you refrain from criticizing me 
publicly for reading the book, turning off the lights so I can’t 
read the book, or to remove the book from the public library.  Or 
your  duty  may  be  to  actual  in  some  way assist  me.  So,  for 
example, others may be obligated to fund public schools where I 
would be taught to read and public libraries that would stock this 
and other books.  Rights theorists typically call the right imposes 
for first sort of duty on others a negative (or liberty) right and 
the  right  that  imposes  for  second  sort  of  duty  on  others  a 
positive  (or  welfare)  right  [13].   In  other  words,  if  I  have a 
liberty right to read, then others are obligated to refrain from 
interfering with my reading.  If I  have a welfare right to read 
others are obligated to provide me the conditions necessary for 
reading.
Below I  will  often talk  about  the “contours” of  a right.  It  is 
worth saying a bit here about what I mean by that.  We often 
think of rights as simple—you have a right, or you don’t.  So, 
for example, if I have a property right to my car, then we might 
think of it as a sort of bubble around my car—I can do what I 
want with my car—dent it with a hammer, paint it bright pink, 
and others cannot do things to my car without my permission. 
But  rights  are almost  never  so simple.  There are all  sorts  of 
things that I am not allowed to do to or with my car—I cannot 
drive it 100 miles an hour on a city street, I cannot drive a car 
that pollutes, etc. Thus, my rights to my car do not form a sort of 
smooth circle around my car, but rather has contours of what I 
can and cannot do in relation to my car. 
Consider my “right to read” again. We often say that we have a 
constitutional right to read what we wish—again it is as if there 
is a bubble of protection around our acts of reading that forbid 
others from interfering with them.  But,  this  bubble  is  dented 
with all sorts of exceptions.  You do not have a constitutional 
right  to  read other’s  private  medical  records,  to  read  pirated 
copies  of  a  work,  to  read  documents  that  contain  national 
secrets,  or to read slanderous remarks about someone.   In all 
these cases the government is permitted to pass laws to restrict 
our access to such works.  Our rights to read have contours that 
are  quite  complex.  Given  this,  the  mere  fact  that  one  has  a 
“right”  with regard to  x,  does  not  answer  the  question as  to 
whether one can do some particular thing with regard to x.  It 
will depend on the precise contours of the right in question.  In 
particular, exactly what actions does the right authorize? 
With this account of rights at our disposal we can characterize 
what the potential conflict  between claims of rights to culture 
and claims to freedom of access.  On the one hand, there is the 
view that indigenous peoples have a right to control access to 
cultural information. This means,  that, if they wish, they may 
assert  a  right  that,  with  regard  to  certain  information,  it  be 
destroyed, all copies be returned to the group, or that, while the 
information  objects  may  remain  outside  the  direct  physical 
control of the group, access this information should be restricted 
according to the wishes of the group.  Such a right would place a 
duty on others to refrain from accessing this information and 
may place a duty on the current “stewards” of the information to 
ensure that the rights of indigenous people with regard to this 
information  are  respected.   Since  the  rights  of  indigenous 
peoples place a duty on others not to access information in some 
cases, this means that outsiders would not be free to access such 
materials. 
5. OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS
Many  have  noted  that  indigenous  peoples  have  unique 
perspectives on the world that provide an important alternative 
to  western  perspectives.  As  Ermine  notes,  western  and 
indigenous  peoples  have,  “disparate  worldviews  each  formed 
and guided by distinct  histories,  knowledge traditions,  values, 
interests,  and  social,  economic,  and  political  realities”  [14]. 
Indeed, this difference is often cited as an important reason that 
such cultures ought to be protected and preserved.  However, the 
fact that indigenous peoples have unique world-views creates a 
special challenge to any theorist trying to provide a discussion 
of the reasons that might support their rights claims.  Indigenous 
peoples themselves may have unique beliefs about the world and 
their  place  in  it  that  grounds their  claims  to  various  cultural 
rights. Non-indigenous peoples should recognize the importance 
that such beliefs have for indigenous peoples and, ideally, could 
learn  new  and  possibly  better  ways  of  being  in  the  world. 
Nevertheless, if as a matter of fact non-indigenous peoples do 
not share these views, then the reasons that may be compelling 
for  indigenous  peoples  will  have  no  grip  on  non-indigenous 
peoples.
John Rawls was the preeminent Political Philosopher of the late 
20th and early 21st Century.  Rawls developed a theory of how 
principles  of  justice  might  be grounded and justified  without 
appealing  to  what  he  called  “controversial  metaphysical 
commitments.”  Rawls argued that in a pluralistic society such 
as many of us live in, we cannot expect that people share the 
same values, metaphysical or spiritual perspectives, and beliefs 
[15].  He argued, however, that in such a society we can agree 
on shared principles, via an “overlapping consensus.” We can 
each  support  a  principle  from  our  own  perspective,  while 
understanding the perspectives of the others.  A simple example 
from the United States context will illustrate this.  Consider the 
idea of the separation of church and state.  Both religious and 
non-religious people can accept this principle as expressing the 
idea  of  the  freedom  of  conscience.   However,  the  religious 
person may be committed to such a principle on the grounds that 
persons  should  come  to  God  as  a  matter  of  individual 
conscience, which would be interfered with if the state in any 
way mandated a particular religion or religious instruction.  The 
atheist may be committed to such a principle on the grounds that 
religions  are  all  equally  false,  but  given  that  people  are 
personally committed to them they should be free to indulge in 
their religious beliefs and practices as much as any other private 
club or activity.  The religious person and the atheist do not have 
to share robust world-views including spiritual, metaphysical, or 
moral beliefs in order to share a commitment to the principle of 
the separation of church and state.   
It is worth noting that this view is not based on skepticism about 
whether there is moral or religious truth.  Rather, it is based on 
the  philosophical  and  practical  recognition  that  reasonable 
persons differ on such issues.  The fact that people differ is not 
based on the ignorance or  perfidy  of  some.   Thoughtful  and 
intelligent persons of good will can have very different views 
about the nature of the universe and the place of human beings 
in this universe.  In the rest of this paper, I try to find principles 
which can form the basis of an overlapping consensus of both 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. 
6.  JUSTIFICATIONS  FOR  LIMITING 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
As noted above rights are always complex. To say we have a 
right to free speech is not to say that we can say whatever we 
want or publish whatever we want. There are many limitations 
on  free  speech  with  which  we  are  quite  comfortable  and 
familiar.  We often do not think of them as limitations, because 
we simply don’t think of certain activities as being covered by a 
right to free speech.  Here I am going to focus on the limitations 
standardly found in U.S. law.  We we can roughly categorize 
such rationales for limiting speech as the following: Copyright 
(or  intellectual  property  more  generally),  Secrecy  (including 
Government  Secrecy  and  Trade  Secrets),  Harmful  Material 
(including  such things as  Obscenity  and Child Pornography), 
and Privacy. 
6.1 Intellectual Property
The most commonly given account of the basis of the putative 
right  of  indigenous  peoples  to  control  access  to  cultural 
information is intellectual property.  The rights of authors under 
copyright  include  the  exclusive  right  to  publish  a  work,  to 
publicly display the work, to make copies of the work, and to 
create  derivative works based  on  the  original  work  [16].   If 
indigenous peoples hold copyright in their cultural information, 
then it would be prohibited for outsiders to reproduce cultural 
information,  to display it,  or  to copy it.   So,  for  example,  it 
would prohibit a person from placing a traditional song, image, 
or story on the internet without the prior permission of the tribe 
to whom this song, image, or story belongs.   
The foundational  idea  of  intellectual  property  is  that  authors 
have rights in their creations. And, in many cases the “author” of 
a work is not a single individual, but a group of individuals.  In 
such cases the copyright is often held by a collective entity of 
which these individuals are members. Think, for example, of the 
copyright that is held by the Disney Corporation. The works in 
question are  often the creation  of  a  large number  of  persons 
working  together  under  the  aegis  of  Disney.  Similarly, 
traditional songs, stories, visual works, etc. are the creations of 
individual indigenous persons working together as members of a 
particular  tribe.   Following  the logic  of  intellectual  property, 
indigenous peoples would have authorship rights in their culture, 
because it is their collective creation.  
There are a number of ways in which copyright seems exactly 
suited to the sorts of rights that indigenous peoples claim in their 
cultural information.  However, there are a number of features 
of  copyright,  at  least  as  it  has  been  established  in  the  U.S. 
constitution and law, that make it a poor fit as a paradigm for the 
rights that indigenous peoples have in relation to their cultural 
information.   
First,  the tradition of copyright in the anglo-american context 
has  always  been  that  it  is  time  limited.   Indeed,  originally 
copyright  could only be held  for  14 years  with one possible 
extension [17].  Even now, while the period of copyright has 
been significantly extended, to life of the author plus 70 years, 
or for corporations 90 years after the publication of the work. 
The idea behind these limitations is that the rights of authors to 
their cultural property must be balanced against the importance 
of  the  free  flow  of  information  characterized  by  the  public 
domain.  Even if we argued that all cultural information should 
now be repatriated based on the argument that past publication 
of the works were forced rather than a genuine choice of the 
peoples in question, any future publication, public performance, 
etc.  of  the  works  would  start  the  clock  ticking.   Indigenous 
peoples would likely not be happy with the thought that if they 
in any way publicly share their culture they will lose rights over 
it in one hundred years.  They precisely do not conceive of their 
culture as something that can go into the public domain of the 
larger culture to be used as persons wish. 
Second, in order for a work to qualify for copyright, it must be 
fixed in a “tangible form of expression” [16].  Thus, for cultures 
that  have traditionally  had strong oral  traditions where works 
may  not  be  written  down,  copyright  would  not  cover  such 
cultural information.  Indeed, as long as a work is oral and not 
written, the copyright would belong to the person or group who 
records or writes down a story or  song,  not  to the person or 
group who originated the story or song. 
Third, the rights of authors under copyright only cover the form 
of the expression, not the idea or story expressed.  With regard 
to a story, for example, it covers the actual words used to tell the 
story, not the form or type of story itself.  This is even more true 
for descriptions of practices.  While  an indigenous group may 
have copyright on a particular description of a practice that they 
engage in, they do not have copyright over the description of 
this  practice.   And,  unless  they  write  down  or  record  the 
particular  movements  of the practice,  they have no copyright 
over it if others come to know about it.  
Finally, even if indigenous peoples were willing to accept time 
limits (or even if we were willing to remove the time limits in 
cases  of  indigenous  cultural  information),  there  are  fair  use 
exceptions to all of the exclusive rights that authors have in their 
works. No author has complete control over his or her works. 
Others may use or  quote  from the work for  the  purposes  of 
commentary and criticism.   Others may use small  pieces  not 
central to the work in “transformative” uses.  And, if the use is 
for scholarly, as opposed to monetary gain, there is more room 
for fair use.  It is not clear that indigenous peoples would find 
such  exceptions  acceptable.   It  is  a  mistake  to  think  that 
indigenous peoples  only object  to  their  works being used by 
others for monetary gain.  It is the inappropriate access and use 
of  such  information  that  is  the  problem  and  the 
inappropriateness can equally be in someone who is using the 
works for scholarly or educational purposes.  
6.2 Secrecy—Trade and State
The  law  also  protects  the  right  of  certain  groups  to  keep 
information  secret.   Some  of  this  falls  under  the  rubric  of 
intellectual property in the form of trade secrets.  There are also 
laws protecting state secrets.  Some have argued that trade or 
state secrets  are the right  model  for  justifying and protecting 
indigenous peoples rights to their cultural property.  
According  to  the  Uniform  Trade  Secrets  Act  [18],  a  "trade 
secret"  is:  “information,  including  a  formula,  pattern, 
compilation,  program device,  method,  technique,  or  process, 
that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from  not  being  generally  known  to,  and  not  being  readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject 
of  efforts  that  are  reasonable  under  the    circumstances  to 
maintain its secrecy.” 
There are features of trade secrecy that again seem to make it a 
poor fit for indigenous people’s rights to cultural information. It 
is,  like  other  things  covered  by  intellectual  property  law, 
intended to promote discovery and innovation.  The idea is that 
people will not be able to spend the time as a group developing 
new products,  inventions,  or  techniques,  if  their  work can be 
taken and used by others. In particular, the focus is on economic 
or monetary value that a secret may potentially have had.  Thus, 
the  value  that  indigenous  persons  may  place  on  some 
information being secret is not captured in the current law on 
trade  secrets.                             
Some  have  suggested  that  indigenous  cultural  information  is 
akin to state secrets.  In one way state secrets seem a better fit. 
They  do  not  focus  on  monetary  value  or  in  promoting 
innovation.   However,  they  do  focus  on  protecting  security. 
According  to the United States  Court  of  Appeals,  "The state 
secrets privilege is a  common law evidentiary rule that allows 
the government to withhold information from discovery when 
disclosure would be inimical to national security" [19].  It is not 
clear  that  all  (or  even  most)  the  cultural  information  that 
indigenous peoples would want to protect would fall under the 
concept of a state secret necessary to protect security. If  it is 
protect the security of their land, then this may give indigenous 
persons an internal reason to have customs,  policies,  or  laws 
protecting such information.  This would limit the information 
so protected to that which could be legitimately understood as 
necessary to protect  the security  of  the  indigenous people  in 
question.  Furthermore,  the  idea  that  certain  information  is 
“secret” depends on the fact that they have not been revealed. 
There seems to be little sense in saying that something that has 
been published and has been widely available in libraries and 
the internet is “secret” information.  Thus, an appeal to secrecy 
would not provide grounds for repatriating information.  
6.3 Harmful Material
In addition to intellectual property and secrecy limitations on 
access  to  information  U.S.  law  also  has  provisions  to  limit 
people’s access to “harmful” information.  Information may be 
harmful in the sense that a person can use the information to 
engage in harmful activities.  So, for example, we might limit 
people’s  access  to  information  about  the  security  plans  of  a 
power plant or town reservoir.  Information may be considered 
harmful in the sense that it is harmful for people to be exposed 
to certain information.  So, for example, there are limitations on 
how  much  graphic  violence  can  be  shown  on  broadcast 
television.  The idea is that it can be upsetting to people to be 
unwittingly exposed to such material.   And,  some may even 
think that information may be harmful to some (children), but 
not necessarily harmful to others (adults).  Thus, the law limits 
children’s  access  to  certain  sorts  of  explicit  sexual  material, 
while not limiting adults’ access to such material. 
It  may be argued that  certain indigenous cultural  information 
can be harmful if accessed by the wrong person in the wrong 
way.  While  arguments  that  information  may  be  harmful  are 
frequently  a  subject  of quite  strong disagreement  and debate, 
decisions  about  whether  material  may  be  restricted  due  to 
putative  harm  is  standardly  determined  through  democratic 
processes as constrained by the Constitution.  It is very possible 
that  non-indigenous  persons  will  not  share  the  views  of 
indigenous  persons  about  the  harm  that  could  result  from 
exposure  to  songs,  images,  or  information  about  religious 
practices.  In other words, the harm justification is unlikely to 
gain an overlapping consensus. 
6.4 Privacy and Confidentiality
The final justification for limiting access to information is based 
on claims of privacy or  confidentiality.  Informational  privacy 
concerns  information  about  persons,  which  is  considered 
“sensitive.”   According  to  Ronald  Standler,  for  example, 
“Privacy is  the  expectation  that  confidential  personal 
information  disclosed  in  a  private  place  will  not  be 
disclosed  to  third  parties,  when  that  disclosure  would 
cause either embarrassment or emotional distress to a 
person  of  reasonable  sensitivities.  Information is 
interpreted  broadly  to  include  facts,  images  (e.g., 
photographs,  videotapes),  and  disparaging  opinions” 
[20].
On  the  face  of  it,  privacy  may  seem  to  be  the  least  likely 
candidate for grounding indigenous people’s rights to cultural 
information.   One tends to think of  privacy as essentially  an 
individual right. Indeed, a number of authors have specifically 
characterized the right of privacy as “the right to be let alone” 
[21].   And  the  supreme  court,  in  rejecting  the  claim  of  a 
corporate right to privacy held that “corporations can claim 
no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to 
privacy” [22].  Indeed, some have actually characterized a right 
to privacy as a right to “individuality.”  This seems on the face 
of it to exclude groups such as tribes or clans from defending 
their  claim to their  cultural  information  as  a type of  right  to 
privacy.  
However, I want to argue that indeed there is a notion of group 
privacy and that it can provide the best grounds for indigenous 
peoples rights to limit access to their cultural information.  The 
value of the right to group privacy—to control what information 
those outside of the group have about the group—is essentially 
the  same  value  as  individual  privacy.   We  can  find  three 
accounts of the underlying values that a privacy right serves in 
the  literature  on  privacy.   We  can  call  these  strands  the 
Consequentialist,  the Kantian Liberal,  and the Communitarian 
views. All of these views provide support for a group right to 
privacy in cultural information.
6.4.1 Consequentialist Defense of Group Privacy 
On  the  consequentialist  view  the  value  of  privacy  is  that  it 
allows  us  to  gain  certain  benefits  and  avoid  certain  harms. 
Posner  discusses  this  feature  of  privacy  in  an  article  that  in 
general is skeptical about the value of privacy [23].  He argues 
that  certain  sorts  of  goods—e.g.,  those  that  require 
confidentiality,  could not  be enjoyed without  privacy.   Some 
argue  that  the  fact  that  people  find  invasions  of  privacy 
personally distressing provides at least some moral grounds for 
preventing and avoiding such invasions. 
It is obvious that the group’s ability to control access to their 
cultural information will often have good consequences.  First, 
in line with Posner’s argument, it will make them more willing 
to share information among themselves and with outsiders, if 
they  know  that  they  can  control  the  extent  to  which  such 
information is disseminated.  This is valuable for the ability of 
the  group to  have  a  rich  culture  and  allows  a  freer  flow  of 
information to the outside.  If the group has no ability to control 
the dissemination of information about their culture, they may 
be less likely to share such information for fear that it will leak 
out  into  the  public  domain.   Second,  it  is  clear  that  many 
indigenous  peoples  find  it  distressing  for  outsiders  to  know 
about,  publicly  display,  etc.,  cultural  information.   Thus, 
limiting  other’s  ability  to  do  this  will  avoid  the  bad 
consequences of this distress. 
6.4.2 Kantian Liberal Defense of Group Privacy
The  Kantian  Liberal  view  holds  that  privacy  is  essential  to 
human dignity.  In particular, it is argued that privacy provides a 
sphere of autonomy for individuals which is necessary for them 
to live authentically  human lives.  If  other’s can use personal 
information about me for their own ends, they fail to treat me 
with dignity as a human being [24].   And, if other’s can observe 
me  without  my permission,  they interfere  with my ability  to 
make my own choices free from external scrutiny.  I call this 
view the Kantian Liberal view of privacy, because it’s emphasis 
on the importance of individual autonomy is clearly inspired by 
Kant’s  idea  that  persons  are  fundamentally  rational  beings 
capable  of choice and his  categorical  imperative that  persons 
ought not be treated as a means.  It is liberal insofar as it focuses 
on the liberty of the individual and the fundamental grounds of 
our capacity for individuality and individual expression.  
It  is  not  only  individuals,  but  also  groups  that  may  be 
“autonomous.”   We  can  call  this  “collective  autonomy.” 
Collective  autonomy  is  closely  tied  to  the  concepts  of  self-
determination  and  sovereignty.  In  order  to  have  collective 
autonomy, we may argue that a group needs what Loretta Todd 
has  called  “cultural  autonomy.”  According  to  Todd,  cultural 
autonomy “signifies a right to one’s origins and histories as told 
from within the culture and not as mediated from without” [25]. 
This  right  to  cultural  autonomy  is  violated  when  others 
appropriate  cultural  information.   As  Todd  describes  it, 
“Appropriation  occurs  when  someone  else  speaks  for,  tells, 
defines,  describes,  represents,  uses,  or  recruits  the  images 
stories, experiences, dreams of others for their own” [25]. This 
idea is closely tied to the argument that Bloustein [24] makes 
that  personal  dignity  is  harmed  when persons  are  used  as  a 
“means” to others entertainment, curiousity, or economic gain. 
In such a case, a person’s dignity and ability to control his own 
life—by  having  control  over  his  identity,  are  harmed.  In  a 
similar way, a group that cannot have some control over how its 
identity as defined when its culture is used, exploited is treated 
as a means, rather than as an end in itself. 
6.4.3 Communitarian Defense of Group Privacy
The  Communitarian  view of  the  value  of  privacy  holds  that 
privacy  is  essential  to  us  as  social  beings  [26]  [27].   In 
particular, it allows us to modulate how much and what type of 
information that others have about us.  This allows us to form 
intimate  relationships  by  selectively  revealing  private 
information to some persons.  According to Charles Fried,  for 
example,  intimacy  requires  that  we have the ability  to reveal 
information  about  ourselves,  which  we  do  not  reveal  to  all. 
Privacy is thus a means to modulate degrees of friendship ([26], 
210-211)   Privacy  provides  freedom  to  define  ourselves  in 
relation  to  others,  by  not  revealing  our  every thought.  ([26], 
212). 
The Communitarian argument can also be marshaled to defend a 
group right to privacy.  Group privacy is important for both the 
capacity for members within the group to form relationships and 
engage in various social and cultural activities, and to modulate 
their relationships with external individuals and groups.   The 
connection between privacy and the ability to form relationships 
can also be seen in the case of group privacy.  Group privacy is 
necessary  for  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  both  internal 
relationships  among  the  members  of  a  group  and  external 
relationships between the group and other groups or individual 
non-group members.   Indeed, Gerstein specifically makes this 
connection in his discussion of privacy [27].  He notes that from 
within the experience of a religious ceremony its significance 
depends  on its  religious meaning  for  the  participants.   “This 
means that there will always be the threat of the degeneration of 
the religious act into a mere form, a hollow shell with nothing 
but its surface attractiveness to give it value.  Again, the need to 
deal with this  threat from within makes it  necessary to resist 
observation from without.  The presence of the onlooker, if it is 
not met with resistance, makes those involved in the ceremony 
accomplices  in  a  concentration  on  the  surface  of  things  at 
expense of inner meaning” ([27], 270).  He argues that even if 
one’s  actions  are  motivated  by  noble  goals  they  can  be 
destructive to the meaning of the act for the participant ([27], 
270).  “[H]e  may  well  feel  as  sense  of  desecration  whenever 
what  was  to  function  purely  as  part  of  the  expression  of  a 
relationship between himself  and his  God is  made use of  by 
others—even as  a  means  of  learning  about  that  relationship” 
([27] 270) 
7. LIMITATIONS ON GROUP PRIVACY
If  we accept  the idea that  indigenous groups have a  right  to 
cultural privacy, which places a duty on states and individuals to 
limit access to certain sorts of cultural information. we are still 
faced with an important question.  “Why do Indigenous Peoples 
(in particular) have a right to cultural  privacy?”  What about 
other  groups  such  as  Scientology,  the  Catholic  Church,  the 
American Library Association,  the Amish? Do they also have 
rights to cultural privacy that we have a duty to respect?  
There are a number of features of the case of indigenous peoples 
that make their claim to cultural privacy much stronger.  First, 
recall that the function of privacy protections is to protect and 
enhance  autonomy,  individual  or  collective,  and  to  preserve 
individuality, personal or cultural.  Some sorts of entities have a 
greater claim to autonomy promoting protections than others—
adults  more  than  children,  humans  more  than  animals. 
Interestingly, it is because some entities have a greater capacity 
for  autonomy  and  a  greater  need  for  it  that  we  are  more 
concerned to promote it.  Some groups have a greater capacity 
and need for autonomy than others.  The more “comprehensive” 
a group is—the more aspects of life it encompasses, the greater 
its capacity and need for autonomy or “self-rule.”  Indigenous 
groups often encompass multiple aspects of their member’s lives
—spiritual,  physical,  educational, political,  etc.  Other groups, 
such as the American Library Association, for instance, do not 
have  this  sort  of  comprehensive  character.  The  ALA  only 
encompasses  the professional  lives  of its  members.  Typically 
members will belong to many other sorts of groups, which will 
encompass other parts of their lives—family, religion, political 
party,  ethnic  group.   Given this  the ALA has both less  of  a 
capacity to be fully an autonomous group and it has less of an 
important  role  in  the  lives  of  its  members.  Thus,  such 
comprehensive communities as indigenous peoples will require 
greater  autonomy,  thus  will  have  a  stronger  claim  to 
informational privacy.
Secondly, it may be that there are certain contextual features of 
some  groups  that  provide  grounds  for  greater  informational 
privacy  protections.   Two  dimensions  of  the  context  of 
indigenous peoples give them greater claim to cultural privacy 
than many other groups: their current context and the historical 
context  of  genocide,  forced  assimilation,  and  cultural 
appropriation.  In the current national and international context 
many indigenous peoples are parts of larger states or cultural 
groups that are both culturally different and culturally dominant, 
there is a greater need for that group’s culture to be protected 
[28]. The case of indigenous peoples,  indeed,  is  of particular 
note,  because  they  face  not  just  neglect,  discrimination,  and 
swamping by the majority culture, but the active appropriation 
and exploitation by the majority culture.  Many within majority 
cultures do not just neglect the cultures of indigenous peoples, 
but try to attain some sort of false authenticity through acts of 
appropriation.   Such  acts  of  appropriation  are  often  also 
commercializing  and  imply  that  the  cultures  are  “dead”  or 
something of the past, rather than living cultures within which 
people find  meaning  and live  their  lives.   This  appropriation 
threatens the meanings of the culture for those who live within 
it. This is a sort of threat that is not faced by such groups as 
those listed above. 
Given that the last two reasons for supporting a duty to respect 
the right to cultural privacy on the part of indigenous peoples are 
heavily  contextual,  it  may  be  that  such  rights  and  the 
concomitant duties, are remedial, rather than eternal.  While the 
concept  of  cultural  privacy  is  important,  it  may  be  that  the 
values of free flow of information are sufficiently important that 
when a group is culturally strong we should strike a different 
balance from the one we strike when the group had not had the 
power to use normal means to protect its culture in the past.  
There are,  however,  important  limits  to the rights of  cultural 
privacy It  is  important  to note that  indigenous groups do not 
exist in a realm separate from other groups and individuals, thus 
it  is  neither  possible  nor  feasible  that  they  have  “absolute” 
privacy.  What they do affects others and insofar as they engage 
with others, there needs to be some degree of transparency in 
their  interactions and they need to be open to discussion and 
criticism.  
In  particular,  it  is  important  that  we  address  concerns  that 
privacy claims may be used to cover up corruption, abuses of 
power,  deception,  etc.  As  Judith  DeCew  has  pointed  out, 
“[P]rivacy appears to be something we value to provide a sphere 
within which we can be free from interference by others, and yet 
it also appears to function negatively, as the cloak under which 
one  can  hide  domination,  degradation,  or  physical  harm  to 
women and others” [29]. Privacy claims may be used to block 
any  public  criticism  by  arguing  that  the  criticism  includes 
“private”  information  about  the  group.  Given this,  it  will  be 
important  to  carve  out  room  for  a  kind  of  Whistle  Blower 
Exception  to  the  rights  of  groups  to  protect  their  cultural 
privacy. 
Finally, the right of group privacy should not be understood as 
absolute. There are other rights of individuals as human beings
—as  encoded  in  the  U.N.  declaration  of  human  rights,  with 
which  these  group  rights  must  be  balanced.   Thus,  if  some 
practice is abusive of individual persons, the right that the group 
has to privacy is overridden.  Of course, some may object to any 
restriction on the grounds that any outside interference will be 
tantamount to imperialistically imposing values.  However, the 
presumption of this paper is that there are some shared values to 
which we may agree.  And, insofar, as the indigenous peoples’ 
points  of  view  are  represented  in  the  UNDIR,  they  are 
committed to the provisions of the U.N. human rights document. 
It is the view expressed in UNDIR that there is no contradiction 
between  the  rights  of  indigenous  peoples  and  the  individual 
rights  as  expressed  in  the  UNDHR,  which  include  rights  of 
expression and access to informatoin.  
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